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ABSTRACT
Existing theoretical models of research joint ventures have
influenced anti-trust policy but have several limitations. They
suggest firms are more likely to cooperate when the technology
is not highly appropriable, as in basic research. They also tend
to ignore motivations associated with complementarity of skills
and resources among potential participants as well] as firm
market share, while suggesting small firms may want to enter
into joint ventures to pool resources and that anti-trust policy
should permit this type of cooperation. We created an economic
model that incorporates multiple factors. This suggests that, in
the presence of high complementarity, firms are more likely to
cooperate and more likely to succeed when the technology is
highly appropriable, as in applied research. Our model also
indicates large firms have a greater incentive to cooperate
because they probably are better positioned to capture the
benefits of a research venture. These findings seem to explain
why cooperative research among rival firms in Japan has been
applied rather than basic, conducted frequently among large
companies, and relatively successful. But firms prefer as small
a partner as possible to limit the sharing of research results,
creating a tension that should make cooperative efforts among
rivals difficult to manage. For this reason, cooperation through
neutral organizations, such as universities or non-profit
institutions, appears to be a useful alternative for rival firms
wishing to pool R&D resources.
INTRODUCTION
A topic of increasing interest as a component of technology strategy and
industrial as well as public policy has been cooperative research and
development (R&D) not simply among suppliers an(d original equipment
manufacturers -- who might collaborate with no conflict of competitive interest
to develop particular products or technologies -- but among riJvals in the same
industry (Fusfeld and Haklisch, 1985; Ouchi and Bolton, 1.988). Thie subject is far
from new: Formal cooperative research was performed by the Chemical
Manufacturers Association and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association in
the United States before 1900 (Batelle Memorial Institute, 1956), and by several
engineering research associations (ERAs) in the United Kingdom prior to 1920
(Johnson, 1973). Informal cooperation among rivals, suclh as "know-how trading"
(von Hippel, 1987 and 1988), may have an even longer history.
But cooperation as a way for rival firms, with or without government
assistance, to pool resources to achieve greater or faster results than they
might accomplish alone has become especially visible as a policy and strategic
alternative with the success of several Japanese cooperative efforts in
semiconductors, computers, and a wide range of other industries during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Patrick, 1986; Imai, 1986; Lynn, 1989). But while
research joint ventures (RJVs) among rivals have proliferated in the United
States and Europe in the form of several multi-million dollar programs (Peck,
1986; Mytelka, 1986; Toole, 1989; Samuels, 1987), government officials and
managers concerned with antitrust as well as industry or firm competitiveness
have had to evaluate increasing numbers of potential collaborative arrangements
for their potential benefits and negative elements. Yet the available theoretical
and empirical work on cooperative R&D remains confusing and provides few
1
III
guidelines to aid in analysis or decision making, since guidelines that exist
appear to be based upon models with only limited applicability.
For example, Bozeman, Link, and Zardkoohi (1983) describe a model of
RJVs in which firms find it optimal to direct cooperative research towards the
basic end of the R&D spectrum. In another influential paper, Katz (1986) shows
that cooperative research is socially beneficial when the technology is not
appropriable and when the agreement concerns basic rather than applied
research. Grossman and Shapiro (1985) base a recommendation for antitrust
policy on similar reasoning and suggest that governments should favor RJVs in
areas of basic research. Rokuhara (1985) and Samuels (1987), on the other
hand, have pointed out that most collaborative research in Japan -- where most
of the successful cases seem to be -- is applied rather than basic and
conducted frequently among large firms.
This paper examines company decisions to cooperate in research in a more
general framework than in previous literature by taking into account the
complementary skills and resources participating firms bring into an RJV. The
model thus explains a broad range of successful and unsuccessful cases as well
as suggests several non-intuitive results.
First, the model supports the notion that firms appear likely to cooperate
in research areas with few expected benefits and technologies difficult to
appropriate. This seems to have been a common rationale for encouraging or
permitting collaborative efforts in basic research among rival firms within the
U.S., few of which have been successful. However, the model indicates this
type of collaboration will occur mainly in cases when participating firms have
few complementary skills and resources. Hence, given few complementary skills
and resources, as well as the difficulty of generating and appropriating benefits
from basic research, the probability of success from these types of
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or too costly from the point of view of society, if patents limit the
dissemination of knowledge. Subsidies may encourage investment in R&D,
although economists widely consider these to be inefficient because subsidies
interfere with market mechanisms. An RJV, on the other hand, as a mechanism
to increase private incentives to innovate as well as the likelihood of success,
appears to have numerous benefits.
Theoretical Benefits and Public Policy
The economic rationales for the existence and desirability of RJVs can
broadly be grouped into three categories. First, RJVs can increase the
efficiency of the R&D process by eliminating duplication of research effort,
facilitating dissemination of technology, taking advantage of economies of scale
or scope, and utilizing synergies by combining R&D capabilities of more than
one firm. Second, by allowing firms to share costs (and/or risks), RJVs can
make it possible for firms to undertake together costly (and/or risky) research
projects that no firm would undertake alone. And third, RJVs can increase
incentives to innovate by allowing firms to overcome the "free-rider" problem
associated with R&D when patent protection is either imperfect or unavailable,
as is often the case with basic research. In the absence of an RJV, firms may
not be willing to invest in discovering knowledge that others could later utilize
for free.
But RJVs can also harm competition by facilitating collusion among the
participating firms. Ordover and Willig (1985) show that, under certain
conditions, particularly when the market is expected to become highly
concentrated, firms participating in an RJV may find it profitable to delay the
realization of an innovation. Firms engaged in an industry-wide cooperative
research effort to reduce costs may also find it optimal to slow down the rate
4
arrangements should be low in theory and appears to be low in practice.
Second, the model indicates that favorable results from research joint
ventures among rivals seem most assured when there is significant
complementarity of skills and resources among the potential partners as well as
greater likelihood of generating and appropriating benefits from the research.
The model also indicates that successful cooperation is likely as long as a
particular firm's share of the R&D costs in the joint venture is relatively low.
Thus, contrary to views of collaborative efforts as ways for rival firms with
small market shares or high costs to combine resources to conduct risky basic
research more effectively, it appears that companies with large market shares
and low-cost positions are more likely to cooperate and cooperate successfully
than small firms. This is because the relative costs of a joint, venture should be
lower for bigger firms, while the larger firms may have an edge in exploiting
any benefits from a joint effort due to their greater market positions.
COOPERATIVE R&D: THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE
R&D has long been recognized as an area of frequent market failure or
frustrations in capturing benefits for the innovators, thus creating great
incentives, even for rival firms, to cooperate in order to reduce risks and costs.
For example, in an empirical study of seventeen innovations in the United
States, Mansfield, Rapoport, Wagner, and Beardsley (1977) found that the rate
of return to society far exceeded that to innovating firms. Firms, therefore,
are likely to invest less in R&D than might be optimal for society in general.
Tax incentives, subsidies, and the granting of patents and copyrights are among
various mechanisms governments have used to provide additional incentives for
firms to invest in innovation, although each has certain disadvantages.
For instance, patenting some innovations is either not feasible technically
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of R&D if industry demand is not very elastic (Katz, 1986). For example, in
1969, the Department of Justice brought an antitrust action against the four
U.S.-based automobile manufacturers, prohibiting them from collaborating in the
development of emission-control equipment for fear that the proposed venture
was meant to delay development of the new technology (Yamamura, 1986).
White (1985) suggests that RJVs could also prove socially disadvantageous
by reducing the number of research paths explored towards a solution and
thereby either reducing the probability of success of an R&D project or
increasing its cost. However, in the highly successful Very Large Scale
Integrated Circuits (VLSI) project, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) purposely assigned different firms to work on different
ways of solving the same problems. Such a multifaceted, coordinated attack
might not have occurred or occurred as rapidly in the absence of cooperation
(Sakakibara 1983).
Overall, economists appear nearly unanimous in the opinion that RJVs are
likely to be socially beneficial in areas when the technology is less appropriable
such as with basic research. Not surprisingly, this thinking has had tremendous
impact on the antitrust laws relating to the RJVs and consequently on the
occurrence of RJVs in the U.S. Although U.S. government officials appeared to
grow increasingly tolerant of collaborative efforts during the 1980s, in the 1980
antitrust guidelines, the Department of Justice took the position that "the closer
[any] joint activity is to the basic end of research spectrum ... the more likely
it is to be acceptable under anti trust law" (Department of Justice, 1980, p. 3).
Even the more recent National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (P. L. 98-642)
"permits joint research and development ventures for the purpose of theoretical
analysis, experimentation, or systematic study of phenomenon or observable
facts." The Department of Justice has thus tended to approve RJVs among
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rivals primarily when they seemed beneficial to society at large and did not
unduly restrain competitive behavior. This scrutiny discouraged firms who might
otherwise have participated in an RJV. For example, the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted in a 1984 investigation that antitrust challenges have been
"frequently cited by industry to explain the reluctance to undertake such
[cooperative research] activity" (U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
News, 1984, p. 3106).
Empirical Studies of RJVs
Not surprisingly, cooperative research among competitors in the U.S. has
largely been confined to areas of basic research and studies related to health
and safety conducted by industry research associations (Batelle Memorial
Institute, 1956). Johnson (1973) reports a similar pattern of joint research
activity in the United Kingdom. Recently established research efforts -- the
Semiconductor Research Corporation, the Microelectronics and Computer
Technology Corporation (MCC), and Sematech in the United States, as well as
programs such as Alvey in the United Kingdom, the European Strategic Program
for Research and Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT), and the
European Research Coordination Agency (EUREKA) -- continue to emphasize
basic research though with increasing amounts of applications (Mytelka, 1986;
Alic, 1986; Toole, 1989). Cooperative research among competitors in applied
areas especially thus represents a relatively new development in Western
economies. Furthermore, even when U.S. government officials have encouraged
cooperative R&D as well as production operations, as in the case of the now-
defunct U.S. Memories joint venture or other proposals to develop high-
definition television, managers have often appeared confused over how to
evaluate the potential benefits of collaboration and, accordingly, reluctant to
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commit financial resources (Pollack, 1990).
In contrast, Japanese cooperative research efforts among rivals have a
relatively long history. Yet, even in Japan, successful collaboration among rival
firms appears to stem less from any specific cultural feature of the Japanese
than from the focus of particular RJVs on applied research and the size (and
thus potential skills and resources as well as market power) of collaborating
firms. For example, in a comprehensive survey of collaborative efforts in more
than 200 large and small firms across six sectors in Japan, Rokuhara (1985)
found that, contrary to the belief popular among economists, less than 14% of
inter-firm collaboration in Japan was directed at basic research. One third of
all such collaboration could be defined as applied and over half could be
considered development. Moreover, unlike the U.S., where large firms appeared
reluctant to cooperate with rivals either because of antitrust concerns or
uncertain benefits, in Japan, large firms were twice as likely to contract for
joint research as small firms.
Studies by Anchordoguy (1989) and Cusumano (1990), which document
cooperative research in Japan's computer industry, support this line of
argument. As summarized in Table 1, MITI has sponsored RJVs in both hardware
and software. Nearly all of the most successful collaborations occurred in the
area of computer hardware, where the technology was highly appropriable by
individual participating firms. For example, the VLSI project, reported to be the
most successful collaborative effort among rivals, resulted in nearly 1,000
patents to the participants as well as helped Japan's large electronics producers
(Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, and Mitsubishi) become leading worldwide
producers of semiconductor memories and other devices used in commercial
computers and related products. At the same time, MITI's efforts to get
Japanese firms together to develop software products -- Where the technology
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turned out to be less developed and more difficult to appropriate -- led to a
series of embarrassing failures.
Insert Table 1 about here
Existing theoretical models thus do not adequately explain the character of
successful collaborative RJVs among rivals in Japan or the reasons why firms
might succeed or fail in these efforts, within Japan or elsewhere. The model of
RJVs presented and discussed in the next sections provides a more general
framework as well as suggests specific propositions for managers and policy
makers.
RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES AS A GAME
A firm's decision to invest in an R&D project depends not only on its own
motives and capabilities and on the nature of the project, but also on the
motives and capabilities of its rivals. Game theory that explicitly considers the
strategies available to competitors, therefore, appears to be an appropriate
framework for analyzing a firm's R&D decisions. Previous game theoretic
models of R&D (for instance, Gilbert and Newbury, 1.982) focused on the
resulting equilibrium level of investment in R&D by different firms. We, on the
other hand, concentrate on the firm's decision -- whether to cooperate in a
particular R&D project or not, with whom, and under what circumstances. We
will therefore consider a specific R&D project with a known investment
requirement but not consider the level of investment in R&D, an approach that





We consider an industry with n firms (i = 1, 2, ..., n) whose costs (cl, c2,
..., cn) are unequal. Define c = (l/n)lci as the mean cost of firms in the
industry. These firms produce a homogeneous product in an industry with a
demand function Q = Q(P), where Q is the industry output and P is the price.
All firms in the model behave non-cooperatively, each maximizing its total
expected profit constrained by the decisions of all other firms.
At issue in this model is the question of investment in a research project
that would require R dollars of investment. This project is expected to reduce
the marginal cost of production by a factor of B. That is, the marginal cost of
production of firm i with cost ci after successful R&D would be ci(l - B).
B (0, 1) is a random variable with mean b and variance s2
In this game, firms choose whether to participate in an RJV for the
particular research project or to do R&D on their owt,. Then the results of
R&D, which are stochastic, become known. For simplicity, we assume that there
is at most only one RJV in the industry working on the particular R&D project,
though this assumption will in no way affect the validity of our results in the
more general case of several RJVs within the industry for the particular R&D
project. Let k ( n) firms in the industry choose to cooperate in the research
project. The other firms (n - k) choose to do research on their own. Each of
the k cooperating firms invests yiR dollars in research on the project, where yi
is the share of the project financed by the ith firm [y i = 1; i (1, k)]. The
other firms (n - k) invest R dollars each on the project.
The R&D project we are considering is in the nature of a patent race in
which there is always one and only one winner (see Reinganum 1984 for similar
patent races). The probability of success of firm j doing research on its own is
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pj. The probability of success of the cooperative venture (treated in the model
as a single entity doing research) is p. We define a complementarity factor gi
by the relation
P = giPi; gi (0, /P i ) (1)
If cooperating firms bring complementary skills and resources to the RJV,
then the probability of success of the RJV may be signi.ficantly higher than that
for a member firm i proceeding alone. In this case the complementarity factor
for firm i will be significantly higher than one. On the other hand,
organizational difficulties could conceivably arise it) combining personnel from
different organizations and locations with different cultures and objectives
(Harrigan, 1983) that might reduce the probability of success of the RJV to a
level below that of a member firm i proceeding alone. The complementarity
factor for firm i in such a case will be less than one. In general, the
complementarity factor will be different for different. firms in the same RJV.
Because the R&D project that we are considering is in the nature of a
patent race, if all firms in an industry cooperate, then the probability of
success of the venture will be one and the complementarity factor will be equal
to or greater than one for all firms, i.e. gi 1 = /pi for all i.
Profitability of a Cooperating Firm: If the joint venture is successful, then
the cooperating firms produce at a lower cost of
Ci = ci(l - B) (2)
where i (1, k). In addition, the cooperating firms may also receive revenue
from licensing the innovation to the other (n - k) firms in the industry who did
not succeed. The expected profit of a cooperating firm under these conditions
is:
E[i] = E[[P - ci(l - B)jqi + ziacBZq j - YiR] (3)
where i E (1, k); j (k + 1, n) and:
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i. a (0, 1) is the appropriability factor. If the results of research are
completely appropriable, for instance, in case of perfect patent protection,
then a = 1. If the results are not appropriable at all, then a = 0.
ii. acB is the royalty per unit of sale which depends upon the appropriability
factor, the mean cost of firms in the industry, and the benefit produced
by R&D. The royalty is the same for all firms in an industry.
iii. zi is the share of the ith cooperating firm in tle royalty obtained from
competitors not participating in the joint venture. Zzi = 1; i E (1, k).
If the cooperative venture is not successful bt one of the non-
cooperating firms succeeds, then each of the k cooperating firms obtains a
license from the successful firm to produce at the unit: cost of
ci = ci(l - B) + acB (4)
The expected profit of the firm in this case is:
E[i] = E[[P 2 - ci(l - B) - acB)}qi - YiR] (5)
Combining (3) and (5), the profit of a cooperating firm is given by:
E[1i] = E[p{(P - ci(l - B))qi + ziacBEqi}
+ (1 - p){(P - ci(l - B) - acB))qi}] - yiR (6)
Profitability of a Non-cooperating Firm: If a tion-cooperating firm j is
successful, then it produces at a cost of:
cj = cj(l - B) (7
In addition, the firm receives revenue from licensing the innovation to the
other (n - 1) firms in the industry who did not succeed. Its total expected
profit is:
E[lj] = E[{P - cj(l - B)jqj + acBZqi - R] (8)
where i (1, n); j (k + 1, n); i j.
If firm j is not successful, then it obtains a license from the successful
firm to produce at the unit cost of
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cj = cj( - B) + acB (9)
Its expected profit in this case is:
E[Rj] = E[[P - cj(l - B) - acBjqj - R] ( 10)
Combining (8) and (10), the profit of a non-cooperating firm is given by:
E[1j] = E[pj{(P - cj(l - B))qj + acBqi
+ (1 - pj){(P - cj(l - B) - acB)qj]j - R (11)
Equations (6) and (11) can be combined to yield a single objective function for
all the firms in the industry:
Max E(Hi) = E[(P - ci')qi + xi(ziPac-Bq - iR)
+ (1 - xi)(piacB~qm - R)] (12)
where i (1, n); j (k + 1, n); m (1, n); j, m i; xi is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 when the firm is cooperating in research and is zero
otherwise. The value of ci' is given by equations (2), (4), (7) and (9) with
probabilities p, (1 - p), i, and (1 - pi) respectively.
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The solution concept we use is that of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. A non
cooperative Nash equilibrium of the above game is. Q" = Zqi"}; which
simultaneously solves problem (12) for all firms. That is, at Q*
E[~i*] = Max E[ (ql ,..',qi,. ',qn")l(l *',i-1 ,qi+] ' ,,qn )]
where n is the number of firms producing positive output in the industry.
Rosen (1965) has demonstrated that a sufficient condition for the existence
and uniqueness of industry equilibrium in such a case is that the symmetric
matrix [G(P,q) + G'(P,q)] be negative definite, where G(P,q) is given by the
Jacobian of the gradient of firms' objective functions:
2Pl+pllq pl+pllql ... P+pql
pl+pllq2 2pl+pllq2 ... pl+pllq2
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G(P,q) = . (13)
pl+pllqn pl+pliqn . . 2Pl+Pllqn
where superscripts denote derivatives. We assume throughout that condition (13)
is satisfied. A sufficient condition for this to be true requires that pll be
bounded from above by a function of p1 (Flaherty, 1980), as the determinants
of the minor of G(P,q) alternate in sign if Pll(qi + qj) is small enough relative
to (p1 )2 . In particular, condition (13) is satisfied if P is linear.
We can now invoke Kakutani's fixed point theorem to prove the existence
of equilibrium in this model. We consider only those firms in the industry which
are producing positive outputs, i.e., for which P(Q) > ci. The first order
condition for (11) is
P(Q) - ci' + l(Q)qi = 0 (14)
From which
qi = -[P(Q) - ci']/P1 (Q) = F(qi, ci'), say. (15)
where qi = qj is the sum of outputs of all firms, except firm i, producing
positive output in the industry.
Let F(Q, c) = (Fl(ql, cl), . . . , Fn(qn, c )), where c = ci' . F(Q, c) is
continuous in Q and c which form compact and convex sets. qi (0, qmax) , and
Ci (cmin, cmax) form compact and convex sets. Ther(efore, from Kakutani's
(1941) fixed point theorem there exists a for which qi* E (0, qmax).
Taking the sum of (14) for all firms in the industry at the equilibrium
output,
np(Q*) - c + Q*p1(Q*) = O (16)
The left hand side of (16) is monotonically decreasing in Q . It can reach the
value of zero only at one point. The industry equilibrium is therefore unique.
Profitability of Firms at Equilibrium: At equilibrium output we obtain
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firm's expected profit from (12) by substituting for q from (15):
E[i] = E[-{(P - ci')2/p 1} + xi(zipacBlqj - yiR)
+ (1 - xi)(PiacB.qm - R)] ( 1 7 )
Substituting in (17) for ci' from equations (2) and (7) with probabilities p and
(1 - p) respectively, the profit of a cooperating firm is:
E[1i] = E[p{-(P - ci(l - B))2/pl + ziacBZqj}
+ (1 - p)-(P - ci - B) - acB)2/pll - yiR (18)
Substituting in (17) for ci' from equations (4) and (9) with. probabilities Pi and
(1 - i) respectively, the profit of a non-cooperating firm is:
E[j] = E[pj{-(P - ci(l - B))2/P1 + acBEqj}
+ (1 - pj).-(P - ci.(1 - B) - a.c.B)2/p1}] - R (19)
Taking expectation, the profit of a cooperating firm J.s given by:
Hi = P{-((P - ci(l - b)) 2 + ci 2 s 2 )/P 1 + ziacbZqj}
+ (1 - p){-((P - ci(l - b) - acb)2) + (ci2 + a2c2)s2)/P]}] - yiR (20)
And the profit of a non-cooperating firm is given by:
nj = pj{-((P - cj(l - b)) 2 + cj2s 2 )/P 1l + acbEqi}
+ (1 - pj){-((P - cj(l - b) - acb)2 + (cj2 + a2 c2)s2)/P 1}] - R (21)
RESULTS FROM THE MODEL
We can now compare (20) and (21) to see which factors would favor
formation of an RJV. We consider the case of two firms i and j with similar
costs (ci = cj) and probabilities of success in R&D if doing research alone (i =
pj). Firm i participates in the RJV and firm j does not. We are interested in
knowing which of the two firms would be more profitable and under which
conditions. The firm that cooperates is more profitable if
E[Hi] - E[j-] > 0.
Substituting from (20) and (21), and using from (1) the fact that p = gii, we
14
obtain after some algebra:
E[ni] - E[j] = R(1 - yi) + piabc(gizilqm - Zqh)
- (ac/P 1 )2b(P - ci(l-- b)) - acb 2 - acs2 }{pi(gi - 1)} (22)
where m (k + 1, n); i, j, h (1, n); i h.
In equilibrium, the value of (22) is non-negative for every firm i
participating in the RJV. The first term on the right hand side of (22) is always
non-negative as yi < 1. The first part of the last term on the right hand side
of (22) is the difference between the non-royalty profits of a firm in case of
successful and unsuccessful R&D and is also non-negative, i.c.,
- (ac/Pl){2b(P - ci(l - b)) - acb 2 - acs 2} > 0 (23)
This assumes that a firm's cost in the case of successful. R&D is never higher
than what it would be in the case of unsuccessful R&D and aH/ac < 0. The sign
of (22), therefore, depends critically on the value of the second term on the
right hand side of (22) and on the value of gi. If organizational difficulties
reduce the complementarity factor for firm i to below unity (gi < 1), then both
the second and the third terms on the right hand side of (22) are negative and
the sole benefit from cooperation to firm i is financial (i.e. cost sharing). In
such a case, firm i may be better off financing tihe R&D through another
source. Also, if gi < 1, then the probability of success of firm i doing R&D
alone is higher than that of the RJV and other members of the RJV will be
better off by limiting their collaboration to the area of finance and leaving firm
i alone to do research on their behalf. In equilibrium, therefore, we should
expect gi to be greater than unity for all firms in an RJV. We now present our
key results in the form of a series of simple propositions and proofs.
Proposition 1: Other things being equal, a firm will prefer to cooperate in
research if the complementarity of skills and resources among the partners is
high.
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Proof: Differentiating (22) with respect to gi we get:
a[E(l i ) - E(nj)]/agi = PiabcziZqm
- {2b(P - ci(l - b)) - ac(b 2 + s2)lacpi /P1 (24)
From (23), the second part of the above equation is always non-negative. Since
the first part of (24) is always positive, we have,
a[E(E i) - E(Hj)]/agi > 0
The effect of complementary skills or resources on the profitability of an RJV
relative to that of a single firm doing research on its own is always positive.
Proposition 2: Other things being equal, firms wi.ll prefer to cooperate if
the cost of an R&D project is high.
Proof: Differentiating (22) with respect to R, th( cost of the R&D project,
a[E(ri) - E(Hj)]/aR = (1 - yi) O0 as yi < 1.
Proposition 3: Other things being equal, the smaller a firm's share in the
total cost of the R&D project, the more likely it will. be to cooperate in
research.
Proof: Differentiating (22) with respect to yi,
a[E(Hi) - E(Ij)]/ayi = - R 0.
Corollary: The larger the subsidy (from the government) towards the cost
of the cooperative R&D project, the more likely firm will be to cooperate.
Proof: A subsidy has the effect of reducing a firm's share in the total
cost of the R&D project, yi, and, to this extent, it encourages cooperation.
Proposition 4: The larger a firm's share in expected royalties the more
likely it will be to cooperate in research.
Proof: Differentiating (22) with respect to zi,
a[E(Ri) - E(Rj)]/azi = PiabcgiZqm 0.
Corollary: A firm may want to cooperate with many partners if an increase
in the number of participants will reduce its share in the cost of the R&D
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project more than it will reduce its share in expected royalties.
Proof: An increase in the share of. R&D cost reduces expected profits from
cooperative research, while an increase in the share of expected royalties
increases expected profits. These are opposing effects. As the number of
partners in the joint venture increases, the share o costs to be borne by a
firm decreases but its share in potential royalties also declines. If all k firms in
the joint venture share cost and royalties equally then yi = zi = l/k, and
a[E(Hi) - E(Rj)]/ak = (R - pjacbgiqm)/k2
The above expression is positive if the cost of R&D is high. It is negative
if the expected royalties from non-cooperating firms are large. If the cost of
R&D is high, then an increase in the number of participants in the joint
venture increases the expected profits as it reduces the cost of R&D to a firm.
But if the royalties expected from R&D are high because of a high probability
of success in R&D if the firm were to do research alone or with fewer
partners, appropriability of the technology, or large expected benefits from
research, then an increase in the number of participants may lower the
expected profits of the firm. This latter effect may, however, be small in
magnitude for firms with large market shares, for wom the output of non-
cooperating firms, qm is small. Firms with large market shares, therefore, may
have a relatively greater tolerance for a larger number- of partners in an RJV.
Proposition 5: If the complementarity factor of a firm is greater than
unity, then, other things being equal, the lower the cost of a firm the more
likely it will be to cooperate in research.
Proof: Differentiating (22) with respect to ci,
a[E(Ji) - E(Hj)]/ac i = 2piacb(l - b)(gi - 1)/Pl < 0 for all gi > 1,
because p1 < O. In our model of Cournot competition among asymmetric firms,
the low-cost firm will have a higher market share in equilibrium [see equation
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(15)]. Thus, the above proposition means that a firms with a large market share
will have a greater incentive to-participate in an RJV. A low market share
firm will have correspondingly smaller incentive to participate in an RJV.
Proposition 6: Other things being equal, a firm will prefer as small a
partner in an RJV as possible.
Proof: We can rewrite (22) by splitting qh, the output of all competitors
of firm i, into two parts comprising the output of the competitors cooperating
in the RJV, Equ, and the output of firms doing research on their own, qm.
E[i] - E[Tj] = R(1 - yi) + Piabc(giziEqm - qm- qu)
- 2b(P - ci(l - b)) - acb 2 - acs21tacpi(gi - l)}/Pl (25)
Differentiating (25) with respect to Equ, the output of the partners of the ith
firm in the RJV,
a[E(Hi) - E(j)]/aZqu = - Piaacb 0.
Proposition 7: In the absence of significant complementarity of skills and
resources, firms will prefer to cooperate in research in areas where the
expected benefits are small and/or the technology is less appropriable. But in
the case of significant complementarity of skills and resources among the
partners, firms will prefer to cooperate in research il areas where the expected
benefits are high and/or the technology is highly appropriable.
Proof: Differentiating (22) with respect to b, the benefits from the R&D
project in terms of expected per unit cost reduction,
8[E(l i) - E(Rj)]/ab = Piac(giziZqm - qh)
- [{P - ci(l - b)) - bac} + bci]2piac(g i - 1)/P 1 (26)
If gi 1 then both the first and the second terms on the right hand side of
(26) are negative. In case of low complementarity, therefore, firms will prefer
to cooperate in areas where the expected benefits from research are small.
But if gi > 1, then the second term on the right hand side of (26) is
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positive. The value of (26) therefore depends on the first term on the right
hand side of (26). If the complementarity of skills and resources is quite high,
particularly if gi is so large that giziZqm > qh, then the value of (26) is likely
to be positive. That is, in the presence of highly complementary skills and
resources, the above result is reversed and firms prefer to cooperate in
research in areas where the expected benefits from research are high.
To investigate the effect of appropriability, we consider equation (22)
again. If gi < 1 then, from (23), the second and the third terms on the right
hand side of (22) are negative. As the absolute value of the second term on the
right hand side of (22) is increasing in a, for any given level of cost of R&D
and for any given set of partners, firms will prefer to cooperate in an area
where a is small. In case of low complementarity, therefore, firms will prefer to
cooperate in areas where the technology is less appropriable.
If gi > 1 then, from (23), the first and the third terms on the right hand
side of (22) are always non-negative. The value of (22) therefore depends on
the second term on the right hand side which is positive if the complementarity
of skills and resources is so large that gizilqm > qh. This means that, for any
given cost of R&D, if the complementarity of skills a(l resources is very high,
then firms will prefer to cooperate in an area where le technology is highly
appropriable. This effect is further enhanced if the pa-tlters of a firm are small.
Proposition 8: When gi > 1, an RJV will nearly always increase consumer
welfare, except where all or most of the firms in an industry participate in it
and industry demand is not very elastic.
Proof: If gi > 1, then the RJV increases the probability of success of an
R&D project. In the absence of collusion, the R&D project always results in
lower costs for one or more firms in the industry and in higher costs to none.
As a result, industry prices fall, output goes up, and consumer welfare
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increases, whether the successful firm participates in the RJV or not. However,
if all or most firms in the industry participate in the RJV and demand is not
very elastic, then consumers receive most of the benefit from cost reduction
and firms have less incentive to reduce costs. An RJV in such a case may
present firms the opportunity to collude and slow down the rate of R&D (Katz,
1986).
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Previous models of RJVs suggested that firms were likely to cooperate in
research in areas where the cost of R&D was high, where the expected benefits
from research were small, and where the technology was ess appropriable, such
as in the case of basic research. These analyses, however, did not consider
variables such as complementarity of skills and resources as well as market
shares. In this section, we first discuss the public-policy and management
implications of complementarity of skills and resources of firms in an RJV and
then outline the strategic implications for the managers of firms participating in
RJVs.
Complementarity and Proprietary Benefits
Complementarity of skills and resources appears to be the most important
factor influencing a firm's decision to participate in an RJV in our model as it
mediates the effects of factors such as the expected benefits from research and
the appropriability of technology. If the complementarity of skills and resources
brought to a venture by the participating firms is low, then the results from
our model are similar to those obtained by earlier models in which firms prefer
to cooperate in areas where the expected benefits from research are small and
where the technology is less appropriable. But if firms have complementary
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skills and resources that may increase the probability of success of the RJV
well beyond the probability of success of a single firm conducting research on
its own, then firms will prefer to cooperate in areas where the expected
benefits from research are high and the technology is highly appropriable.
Figure 1 shows the interaction of complementary skills and resources of
firms participating in an RJV with the expected benefits from research and the
appropriability of technology. The vertical axis represents a multiplicative
combination of the expected benefits from research and the appropriability of
technology, which might be called the expected proprietary benefits from
research. The horizontal axis represents complementarity of skills and
resources measured by the increase in the probability of success of an RJV
beyond the probability of success of a single firm acting alone. The combination
of these factors results in four fundamentally different types of RJVs
represented by the four quadrants in Figure 1. The RJVs in these quadrants
differ in the likelihood of their occurrence, in the probability of their success,
and in the motives behind their formation.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Quadrant I: RJVs in this quadrant are characterized by high levels of
complementary skills and resources as well as high proprietary benefits. Almost
by definition, then, they involve projects relatively close to commercial
applications, with sufficiently clear or focused topics so that firms can
effectively bring together skills and resources, even though individual companies
are still responsible for commercialization of the research results. This type of
cooperation seems to describe much of the successful research among rival
Japanese firms (Rokuhara, 1985; Samuels and Levy, 1989), for example, in
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semiconductors (Sakakibara, 1983), computer hardware (Anchordoguy, 1989),
biotechnology (Saxonhouse, 1986), and aerospace (Samuels and Whipple, 1988)
An extreme case of complementarity occurs when all or most firms in an
industry cooperate. The probability of success of such an RJV is nearly one and
the complementarity factor is high for most participants. Such RJVs may be
expected to be nearly always profitable. The large number of industry wide
cooperative efforts to set up standards falls in this category. The probability of
one firm setting an industry standard on its own is small, though not
impossible, as in the case of computer mainframes (IBM's Systems 360 and 370)
or video recorders (Japan Victor's VHS standard), but the probability of success
increases significantly if most firms in an industry cooperate.
Quadrant II: Projects that fall into this quadrant are characterized by high
complementarity of skills and resources but low expected benefits from research,
due to low appropriability of the technology, as in the case of focused but still
basic technology development. These projects may also include applied areas
where patents would be difficult or unwise to obtain, perhaps because the
technology involved is difficult to specify precisely, as in some manufacturing
processes, or the knowledge may be useful for various firms only in certain
contexts, so companies feel little need or ability to protect it.
Accordingly, while firms pursuing cooperation within Quadrant I might
actively seek formal partnerships on their own or with minimal encouragement
from government, because of high expected benefits and highly appropriable
technology, for Quadrant II projects, one might expect either modestly
subsidized efforts in basic research among firms that appear to have
complementary skills as well as loosely structured strategic alliances or
relatively informal cooperation among firms to develop specific but not
particularly appropriable technologies. The latter would include instances of
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informal know-how trading, such as in steel manufacturing or other processes,
described by von Hippel (1987, 1988)' and Schrader (1989).
Quadrant III: Projects in this quadrant are characterized by low
complementarity of skills and resources, such as when research objectives are
unclear and participants are unable to complement one another, as well as by
low proprietary benefits, such as in the case of basic research or applications
difficult to patent. These types of cooperative efforts should be the least
desirable from the point of view of managers and policy makers because they
are least likely to bring any benefits to the participants or to society at large.
Project planners or champions would probably be very unlikely to agree in
advance that their efforts were likely to fall into Quadrant III, although the
model encourages managers and policy makers to assess realistically the
potential complementarity of skills and resources among the participants as well
as the potential outcomes of a project. When both inputs and outputs seem
vague or difficult to patent or apply, the project is very unlikely to succeed
and may not be worth pursuing.
The characteristics of RJVs in this quadrant give rise to two concerns.
First, since basic research is necessary for technological progress and returns
to society in general may be very high, even if individual firms may find basic
research difficult to appropriate benefits from, to what degree should
governments actively subsidize RJVs that would fall into this unattractive
quadrant? And second, what is the preferred organizational arrangement for
conducting R&D projects unlikely to succeed or at least have short-term
applications?
The answers to these two questions are related. If there are only a few
firms in an industry among whom coordination could be achieved easily, then a
subsidy tied to performance and monitored closely may be socially beneficial.
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But the case for subsidy in absence of coordination is weak. Firms should
cooperate on RJVs in this quadrant on their' own. If they do not, then they
probably have more attractive R&D options. If such firms are brought together
by a subsidy, then they will have an incentive to limit their participation. If
there are several firms in an industry among whom coordination may be
difficult, then research initiatives independent of individual firms, such as
through industry or trade organizations, or universities, may be better vehicles
to carry out the research program.
Quadrant IV: Large expected benefits from research due to high
appropriability of technology but low complementarity of skills and resources
among the partners characterize RJVs in this quadrant. In these types of
efforts, firms probably cooperate primarily for monetary reasons -- combining
financial resources to fund development of a promising new product or process
that. seems patentable or easily made proprietary, even though the participants
do not possess, at least initially, complementary technical skills.
For example, developing new products and processes is extremely expensive
in industries such as aerospace and telecommunications. The cost of developing
a new aircraft engine is estimated at over $1.5 billion and that of developing
certain computerized digital switches at over $1 billion (Hladik, 1988). Sharing
costs or risks, therefore, might provide a strong motivation for cooperation
even among rival firms. However, RJVs should not be regarded as substitutes
for capital markets. A firm that can carry out a research project in this
quadrant without assistance may be better off obtaining funds on its own. This
probably explains the failure to get rival firms to cooperate when individual
companies have the technical skills and financial resources to proceed alone,
even at considerable risk, and the technology is highly appropriable, but the
market size or growth and thus financial returns from cooperation are also
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unclear.
Market Share and Partner Size
The existing literature on RJVs is silent about the differences between the
motives for cooperation of large and small firms. In our model, the large
market-share firm has a greater incentive to cooperate with industry rivals than
a small firm. The reasons are as follows: Sharing costs in an RJV entails
sharing income from royalties, but royalties should be relatively less important
to the large market-share firm, which stands to gain more non-royalty profit
from a reduction in production costs or other innovations because of its large
output. This is also the reason why the large market-share firm should have a
greater tolerance for numerous partners in an RJV.
The above result accords well with the frequency with which the names of
market leaders such as General Electric, AT&T, Phillips, Siemens, Boeing, and
United Technologies (Pratt and Whitney Division) appear in the literature on
RJVs (Hladik, 1988). In Japan as well, while Rokuhara (1985) found instances of
small firms pooling resources, large Japanese firms more often participated in
RJVs. In fact, thirty large Japanese firms accounted for one third of the
membership in all government-sponsored research associations (Samuels, 1987),
leading Samuels to conclude that large firms, with a variety of internal
capabilities, were best positioned to take advantage of an RJV. Johnson (1973)
documented similar findings in the United Kingdom, where engineering research
associations initially established to assist small firms eventually derived their
main support from large companies.
In our model, for any given level of complementarity of skills and
resources, and for any rule governing the sharing of R&D expenses and
potential royalties, firms also prefer as small a partner as possible. A decision
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to participate in an RJV means the potential loss of royalties from rival firms
participating in the venture, and this is small if the partners are small. An
ideal partner will thus not be an industry rival but bring complementary skills
and resources with zero market share. The frequent collaborative research
efforts between large firms and universities or non-profit research institutions
are examples of this type of non-rival cooperation and seem to represent a
practical alternative for R&D partnerships. Indeed, managers seem to have
recognized this already, as discussed in Mytelka (1986), who reported that, in
the U.S. between 1967-1977, industry-sponsored university and non-profit
research expanded two-thirds faster than in-house company research.
Yet the attraction of RJVs for large firms and the preference of firms for
as small a partner as possible present difficulties for firms wishing to establish
RJVs within an industry. An RJV comprising the largest firms is not the most
desirable one from the point of view of participants. Left on its own, a large
firm will prefer a small partner that would nevertheless bring in complementary
skills and resources. But our model suggests that a small firm with the skills
and resources to carry out research on its own has merely a small incentive to
participate in an RJV with a large rival, hence the difficulty in achieving an
ideal configuration of partners in an RJV. Uneasy alliances are bound to occur
in which the mutual expectations of partners will not be fulfilled. This
realization may account for the frequent problems that arise in the management
of RJVs in general and their high rate of failure (Harrigan, 1983).
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this paper has been to model a firm's decision to cooperate in
research with industry rivals not simply to evaluate antitrust policy but to
provide insights into a number of conflicting decisions and compromises that
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managers of firms participating in or contemplating RJVs must face. We
demonstrated that the results from previous models of RJVs that ignored factors
such as complementarity of skills and resources of firms participating in an RJV
were only partly valid. For example, these models predicted that cooperation
would generally take the form of small firms in basic research, which has a
relatively low probability of successful commercialization. In the presence of
complementary skills and resources, however, we showed that successful
cooperation was more likely and more desirable for firms when the technology
is highly appropriable. Our model also indicated that large firms have
potentially more ways to apply research results and thus gain from cooperation
with industry rivals.
These general insights from the model also seem to explain reports of
successful cooperative research in Japan: Most of the successful Japanese
projects have focused on applied rather than basic research and were conducted
primarily among large companies. There is thus a need to reexamine existing
models of cooperative R&D as well as government policies that encourage RJVs
mainly for basic research and among firms with relatively small market shares.
These types of RJVs are not likely to succeed and do not seem particularly
desirable for companies.
In general, an RJV should bring at least two key benefits to participants.
First, the complementary skills and resources of participating firms may increase
the probability of success in research. And second, the cost of R&D for
participating firms should be reduced. But RJVs may create as many problems as
they solve because firms face conflicting goals and difficulties in coordination.
They also need to share any appropriable benefits of R&D with other
participants. Our model suggests that large firms should have a large incentive
to cooperate, given their greater potential benefits from the research, but they
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prefer small partners to limit how much they must share the venture's results.
Small firms with the necessary skills, on the other hand, probably prefer to do
their R&D alone. These contradictions make the ideal RJV among industry rivals
difficult to achieve and probably account for much of the stress that
accompanies RJVs in operation.
This analysis also indicates that cooperative R&D among industry rivals is
not an ideal form of research partnership, precisely because of conflicting goals
and incentives. The model thus confirms that firms are probably better off
looking for partners in an RJV among universities, non-profit research
institutions, or firms outside their industry. Nevertheless, as the Japanese cases
demonstrate, RJVs among rivals may indeed prove successful if they are focused
on applied technologies where individuals firms can foresee appropriable benefits
from the research, divide tasks to reduce conflicts, and bring sufficient
complementary skills and resources to the venture without comprising other
company goals or competitive rivalries.
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank . Therese Flaherty,
Rebecca Henderson, Mel Horwitch, Garth Saloner, and Ricl.ard Samuels for their




Alic, J. (1986) "Cooperation in R&D: When Does It Work?" Paper prepared for
the Colloquium on International Marketing Cooperation between Rival
Trading Nations, San Milano, Italy, May 29-31.
Anchordoguy, M. (1989) Computers, Inc.: Japan's Challenge to IBM, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Batelle Memorial Institute (1956) Research by Cooperative Organizations: A
Survey of Scientific Research by Trade Associations, Professional and
Technical Societies and Other Cooperative Groups, under contract to the
National Science Foundation.
Bozeman, B., A. Link and A. Zardkoohi (1983), The Economics of a Tax Credit
for Joint Venture R&D, Working Paper E830408, University of North
Carolina at Greensborough.
Cusumano, M. A. (1990) Japan's Software Factories, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Flaherty, M. T. (1980) "Industry Structure and Cost Reducing Investment,"
Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 5, 1187-1200.
Fusfeld, H. I. and C. S. Haklisch (1985) "Cooperative R&D for Competitors,"
Harvard Business Review, November-December, 60-70.
Gilbert, and Newbury (1982) "The Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic
Review, 221-230.
Grossman, S. and H. Shapiro (1985) "R&D Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
Harrigan, K. R. (1983) Strategies for Joint Ventures, Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books.
Hladik, K. J. (1988) "R&D and International Joint Ventures," in F. J. Contractor
and P. Lorange (eds.) Cooperative Strategies in International Business,
29
a_ X^-·llll
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Imai, Kenichi (1986) "Japan's Industrial Policy for High Technology Industry," in
Hugh Patrick, ed., Japan's High Technology Industries: Lessons and
Limitations of Industrial Policy, Seattle: University of Washington Press,
pp. 137-169.
Johnson, P. S. (1973) Cooperative Research in Industry: An Economic Study, New
York: John Wiley and Sons.
Kakutani, S. (1941) "A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem," Duke's
Mathematics Journal, Vol. 8, 457-458.
Katz, M. L. (1986) "An Analysis of Cooperative Research & Development," Rand
Journal of Economics, Winter, 527-543.
Lynn, Leonard (1989) "Collaborative Research in Japan," Venture Japan, Vol. 1,
No. 4, pp. 46-51.
Mansfield, E., J. Rapoport, A. Romeo, S. Wagner, and G. Beardsley (1977) "Social
and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovation," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 91 (May): 221-240.
Mytelka, Lynn K. (1986) "Knowledge-Intensive Production and the Changing
Internationalization Strategies of Multinational Firms," in J. Caporaso, ed.,
A Changing International Division of Labor, Boulder, Co.: Lunne Rienner.
Ordover, J. A. andR. D. Willig (1985) "Antitrust for High-Technology Industries:
Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers," The Journal of Law and
Economics, 28 (May), 311-333.
Ouchi, W. G. and M. K. Bolton (1988), "The Logic of Joint Research and
Development," California Management Review, Spring, 9-33.
Patrick, Hugh (1986) "Japanese High Technology Industrial Policy in Comparative
Context," in Hugh Patrick, ed., Japan 's High Technology Industries: Lessons
and Limitations of Industrial Policy, Seattle: University of Washington
30
Press, pp. 3-33.
Peck, Merton J. (1986) "Joint R&D: The Case of Microelectronics & Computer
Technology Corporation," Research Policy, 219-231.
Pollak, Andrew (1989) "Memory Chip Cooperative is Officially Declared Dead,"
The New York Times, 16 January 1990, p. D1.
Reinganum, J. (1984) "Practical Implications of Game Theoretical Models of
R&D," Academy of Management Papers and Proceedings, 74: 61-66.
Rokuhara, A. (ed.) (1985) Kenkyu Kaihatsu to Dokusen Kinslh Seisaku (R&D and
Anti-Monopoly Policy), Tokyo: Gyosei.
Rosen, J. B. (1965) "Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave
N-Person Games," Econometrica, Vol. 33, 520-534.
Sakakibara, K. (1983) "From Imitation to Innovation: The Very Large Scale
Integrated (VLSI) Semiconductor Project in Japan," Working Paper No.
1490, Cambridge, MA: Sloan School of Management, .I.T.
Samuels, R. P. (1987) "Research Collaboration in Japan," M.I.T. -Japan Science
and Technology Program Working Paper No. 2, Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Samuels, R. J. and J. D Levy (1989) Institutions and Innovations: Research
Collaboration as Technology Strategy in Japan, Paper presented at the
Conference on Oligopolies and Hierarchies: Strategic Partnerships and
International Competition, Foundation de Royaumont Asnieres-sur-Oise,
France.
Samuels, R. J. and B. Whipple (1988) "Defense Production for Industrial
Development," in C. Johnson et al. (eds.), Politics and Productivity: flow
Japan's Development Strategy Works, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Books.
Saxonhouse, Gary R. (1986) "Industrial Policy and Factory Markets:
Biotechnology in Japan and the United States," in Hugh Patrick, ed.,
31
I^__ l _____l_L l __i__ 1_ 1-_
Japan's igh Technology Industries: Lessons and Limitations of Industrial
Policy, Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 97-136.
Schrader, Stephan (1989) "Informal Technology Transfer Between Companies:
Information Leakage or Know-How Trading?" Sloan School of Management
Working Paper #3007-89/BPS (May). Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
Suzuki, M. (1986) Comparative Study of the American and Japanese Policies
Concerning Cooperative R&D, Working Paper, MIT-Japan Science and
Technology Program, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts nstitute of
Technology.
Toole, Gregory (1989) ESPRIT and European Software Capabhiity: An Analysis
of Cooperation in Software Technology R&D, Cambridge, MA: Unpublished
Master's Thesis, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.
von Hippel, Eric (1987) "Cooperation between Rivals: Informal Know-how
Trading," Research Policy, Vol. 16, pp. 291-302.
(1988) The Sources of Innovation, New York and London: Oxford
University Press.
Yamamura, Kozo (1986) "Joint Research and Antitrust: Japanese vs. American
Strategies," in Hugh Patrick, ed., Japan's High Technology Industries:
Lessons and Limitations of Industrial Policy, Seattle: University of
Washington Press.
U.S. Department of Justice (1980) Antitrust Guide Concerning Research
Joint Ventures, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News (1984) "National Cooperative




Japanese Cooperative R&D Projects in the Computer Industry





1966-68 Super High Performance
(12 billion)






Led to the production of the first
Japanese mainframe computer, the
FACOM 230-50, though the
introduction of IBM 360 in 1964
made it obsolete.
Developed the ICs and high speed
memory necessary for larger and
faster computers.
Permitted Japanese companies to
offer a full range of small to
large mainframe computers.
Generated some 1,000 patents,
helping move Japan into world
leadership in the areas of 64K,
128K, and 256K semiconductors.
Gave Japan a lead in the technology
of optoelectronic ICs.
Software Projects:
1966-72 Japan Software Company
(2 billion)




1973-76 Software Module Project
(3 billion)
Common development language and
basic software for different
architectures. Complete failure.
70 packages developed. Very limited
usage.
Pattern-information (graphics)
software, mainly for Japanese
language processing. Several


























1982-91 Fifth Generation Project
(50 billion)
Initial goal of automatic code
generation scaled down to the
development of working aids for
software programmers. The
software tools failed to find
a market.
Helped develop Japanese language
word processors.
Interactive, UNIX-based tool set
for maintenance and development.
Improved experience level of
Japanese firms with UNIX.
Network to link work stations
using OSI protocols. Improvement
in interface standards likely.
Development of CASE tools for
automated code generation from
formalized specifications.
Limited participation.
Development of UNIX-based support
tools as well as reusable code and
packages, for a national network.




parallel computing hardware and
software. Major long-term advances
possible in Japanese AI capabilities.
Short-term potential for software
automation and reuse support.
Limited commercial applications,
however, and lukewarm support
from major companies.
Note: All figures in current yen.
1 billion yen = Approximately $7 million in 1989.
Sources: Anchordoguy (1989) and Cusumano (1990).
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